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Abstract 
This article describes the politics related to the criminalization of torture in South Africa. It 
studies the differences between torture as an international crime and as a crime under 
international human rights law. The South African anti-torture law is analysed and critiqued 
against the standards and provisions set out in the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The article 
recommends amendments to the South African law, aimed at making the combating of 
torture more effective. 
 
Introduction 
The South African Constitutions of both 1993 (Interim Constitution)1 and 1996 (Final 
Constitution) made provision for the right to be free from torture and not to be treated 
or punished in a cruel, inhuman and degrading way. Even before the first democratic 
elections of 1994, the then National Party government of South African had signed the 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) in 1993. The new African National Congress 
government ratified it in 1998, thus signifying that a democratic South Africa would take 
its obligations under international human rights law seriously. In July 2013, South 
Africa incorporated UNCAT into national law by enacting the Prevention and 
Combating of Torture of Persons Act (PCTPA).2 Until then, acts of torture were 
punishable under the common law as either common assault or assault with intent to 
commit grievous bodily harm. These types of assault attracted lesser punishments than 
the kind of punishment envisaged under UNCAT. Besides, where the police were 
charged with acts amounting to torture, it was the cabinet minister responsible who 
was held to account under civil law in his official capacity, and not the perpetrator 
himself, as provided under UNCAT. 
 
This article is divided into three parts. The first deals with the history and politics 
related to the passing of the PCTPA. The second studies the differences between torture 
as a crime under international criminal law and as a crime under international human 
                                                          
1 Sec 11 provides: “Freedom and security of the person: (1) Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which shall include the right not to be detained without trial. (2) No person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, 
mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
2 Act 13 of 2013. 
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rights law. The final section analyses South African anti-torture law against the 
background of the benchmarks set by UNCAT. 
 
The historical and political background to South Africa’s anti-torture law 
The euphoria of freedom in the early 1990s soon faded when violent crime in South 
Africa rose to unprecedented levels. The public became frightened and demanded action 
from the government. The then President Mandela went so far as to resort to a metaphor 
of war to emphasize the urgent need to act, stating in his opening address to Parliament 
in 1995 that it was time “to take the war to the criminals” and not to permit a “situation 
in which we are mere sitting ducks”.3 The public outcry against spiralling crime became 
increasingly provocative, exemplified by the refrain “criminals have more rights than 
victims”.4 In general, political and public sentiment had become less than tolerant of 
the procedural rights that criminal suspects and prisoners had come to enjoy under the 
democratic constitution. Reports by oversight bodies about serious violations 
committed at the hands of the police and prison officials attracted scant public 
attention;5 only exceptional accounts regarding the assault and torture of suspects and 
prisoners drew a measure of sympathy. The unrelenting prevalence of violent crime, 
coupled with the government’s obsession with tougher law enforcement, made it a 
challenging environment in which to advocate for an anti-torture law. 
 
With Parliament reluctant to take up the issue of torture, NGOs stepped into the breach. 
From 2002, when the Robben Island Guidelines6 were endorsed by the African 
Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights,7  NGOs started urging   the   government   
to   criminalize   torture.   The   issue   of   torture and other forms of inhuman and 
degrading treatment became the subject of a number of South African publications8 and 
court cases. The need to criminalize torture also arose, against the background of the 
findings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which recorded 
                                                          
3 Opening of Parliament address by President Mandela, 17 February 1995, Cape Town. 
4 See A du Plessis and A Louw “Crime and crime prevention in South Africa: 10 years after” (2005) 2 Canadian Journal of Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 427 at 437. See also M Schönteich “Criminal justice policy and human rights in the new South Africa” (2003) 3 
Queensland University of Technology Law Review 1 at 3. 
5 See Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) “Annual report 1998–99” at 24–26 and ICD “Annual report 2000–01” at 2. 
6 See JB Niyizurugero (ed) Preventing Torture in Africa (proceedings of a joint Association for the Prevention of Torture and African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights workshop, Robben Island, South Africa, 12–14 February 2002) (2003, Association for the 
Prevention of Torture). The guidelines are the first instrument in the African system for the protection of human rights, specifically 
designed to combat torture.  
7 Res 61 (XXXII) 02: “Resolution on guidelines and measures for the prohibition and prevention of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in Africa” (2002). 
8 See L Fernandez “Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment” (2005) 1 Law, Democracy and Development 136; L Muntingh Guide to the UN Convention against Torture in South 
Africa (2005, Civil Society Prison Reform initiative, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape); L Muntingh and L 
Fernandez “A review of measures in place to effect the prevention and combating of torture with specific reference to places of 
detention in South Africa” (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 123; L Muntingh “Children deprived of their liberty: 
Protection from torture and ill treatment” in A Van Niekerk, S Suffla and M Seedat (eds) Crime, Violence and Injury in South Africa: 
21st Century Solutions for Child Safety (2012, Psychological Society of South Africa) 162, available at: 
<http://www.mrc.ac.za/crime/Chapter12.pdf> (last accessed 1 March 2013); L Muntingh L and Z Satardien “Sexual violence in prisons 
– Part 1: The duty to provide safe custody and the nature of prison sex” (2011) 24 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 1; L 
Muntingh “The betrayal of Steve Biko: South Africa’s initial report to the UN Committee against Torture and responses from civil 
society” (2008) 1 Law Democracy and Development 178. See also D Bruce “Police brutality in South Africa” in N Mwanajiti, P 





4,800 incidents of torture under the apartheid regime, including the period during 
which the commission sat.9 Criminalizing torture would not only fulfil the 
government’s moral obligation owed to the freedom fighters who were murdered or 
mutilated at the hands of the apartheid police, but would also demonstrate a firm resolve 
to hold torturers legally and personally accountable for their conduct. Indeed, it was the 
death in police custody of the South African student leader Steve Biko in 1977 that 
prompted the UN General Assembly to commence work on what became UNCAT.10  
 
Emerging jurisprudence 
In its 2008 decision in the case of Mthembu v S, the Supreme Court of Appeal refused 
to follow the tendency of the courts under the apartheid regime not to exclude evidence 
obtained under torture. The court pointed out that, in the pre-constitutional era, the 
courts readily admitted all relevant evidence, regardless of how it was obtained, subject 
only to the judge’s discretion to disallow it if the strict rules of admissibility would have 
the effect of operating unfairly against the accused. Real evidence, meaning an object 
(such as a knife, document or photograph) that becomes evidence following proper 
identification, was more readily admitted because its admission was governed by statute. 
The reason for this “was that such evidence usually bore the hallmark of objective 
reality compared with narrative testimony that depends on the say-so of a witness”.11 
Citing the UNCAT definition of torture in full, the court emphasized that the absolute 
prohibition against torture, even in the event of a public emergency, is a peremptory 
norm of international law that the South African Constitution follows, and it extended 
the non-derogation principle  to include cruel,  inhuman and degrading treatment: 
“[t]he absolute prohibition on the use of torture in both our law and in international law 
therefore demands that ‘any evidence’ which is obtained as a result of torture must be 
excluded ‘in any proceedings’”.12 Mthembu was an important decision as it pointed the 
way for other courts regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained by improper 
means. 
 
In 2006, when the UN Committee against Torture (CAT), which oversees the 
implementation of UNCAT, was assessing South Africa’s initial report, it was informed of 
a particularly brutal assault that prison officials had carried out on prisoners in the St 
Albans prison in Port Elizabeth in July 2005, reportedly in retaliation for the fatal 
stabbing of a warder. In deliberations with CAT, the South African government evaded 
the allegations and stated that, as the matter was subject to a civil claim, it was sub 
judice.13 The prisoners were denied access to medical treatment and legal representation 
until September 2005. One prisoner, McCallum, assisted by legal counsel, made numerous 
fruitless attempts to have the mass assault investigated and to seek relief. In 2008 he 
                                                          
9 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (1998, Juta & Co), vol 2, chap 3, para 220. For torture under apartheid, see also D 
Foster, D Davis and D Sandler Detention and Torture in South Africa (1987, James Currey) at 1–35; and L Fernandez “Police abuses of 
non-political criminal suspects: A survey of practices in the Cape Peninsula area” (Institute of Criminology UCT Research Report 
Series, report 1–91). 
10 NS Rodley and M Pollard The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2009, Oxford) at 44. 
11 Mthembu v S (64/2007) [2008] ZASCA 51, para 22. 
12 Id, para 32. 




lodged an individual petition with the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC).14 In its 
view, released in 2010, the HRC found that his right to be free from torture, protected by 
article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), had been 
violated.15 The HRC ordered the South African authorities to conduct a thorough and 
complete investigation and prosecution of those who were responsible, and to provide 
the victim with adequate compensation.  The South African government did not 
respond to the decision until almost a year later, when the South African Human 
Rights Commission brought the matter before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services (now the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice and 
Correctional Services).16 The Department of Correctional Services’ response was that had 
it been informed beforehand that the outcome would have been different. This was, of 
course, untrue, as the HRC had on five occasions invited the South African government 
to respond.17 The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
subsequently took up the broader issue of torture and held public hearings on the 
prevalence of torture in November 2011, which indicated a growing awareness of the 
absolute prohibition of torture.18 The McCallum decision turned out to be extremely 
embarrassing, for it not only indicated multiple system failures on the part of the state 
to protect the rights of prisoners, but revealed the inept manner in which the government 
had interacted with the HRC. In December 2012, the World Organization against Torture 
(OMCT) called upon the South African authorities to implement the HRC’s views by 
undertaking a prompt, thorough and complete investigation and prosecution of those 
who were responsible, and by providing McCallum and the other victims with full 
and adequate compensation.19 A civil damages suit was subsequently brought against 
the minister of correctional services in the Port Elizabeth High Court, but at the time of 
writing the matter had not yet been concluded. 
 
Other law reform 
In 2011 the then existing police oversight body, the Independent Complaints 
Directorate, was replaced by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) 
under a new law, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011 (IPID 
Act), compelling the IPID to investigate allegations of torture. However, at the time, 
there was no statutory definition of torture. During the public hearings that were held 
on the IPID Bill, it was proposed that the IPID Act should define torture, even if only as 
an interim measure, as the definition of torture was key to the IPID discharging its 
mandate effectively. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police was concerned 
                                                          
14 See Bradley McCallum v South Africa comm no 1818/2008, UN doc CCPR/C/100/D/1818/2008 (2010), paras 2.5 and 2.9. 
15 ICCPR, art 7: “No-one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no-one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
16 Telephone interview with Ms J Cohen, parliamentary programme, SA Human Rights Commission, 3 December 2011 (copy on file 
with the authors). 
17 CCPR/C/100/D/1818/2008, para 4. 
18 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) report on the meeting of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 
29 November 2011, available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctionalcentres 
(last accessed 28 December 2011). 
19 “South Africa: OMCT calls for the effective implementation of the decision of the Human Rights Committee for acts of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment” (26 November 2012), available at: <http://www.omct.org/monitoring-




about the bill’s lack of a definition of torture, as this would make it difficult to 
determine which acts constituted torture and on what grounds the IPID would conduct 
an investigation of torture. The committee evidently decided that it was not going to 
deal with the absence of a definition of torture, thereby implying that it was a task for 
the Portfolio Committee on Justice.20 It can, however, be concluded that at least the 
Portfolio Committee on Police realised the importance of criminalizing torture and 
may thus have alerted the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional 
Development to the urgent need for such legislation. 
 
South Africa’s initial report to CAT became due in 1999. It appears to have prompted 
some response from the government at the time and the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (as it then was) selectively circulated a draft act to 
criminalize torture in 2003. A few stakeholders submitted comments,21 but the process 
was halted until a second version was circulated in 2005. Both versions exhibited 
notable shortcomings.22 By the time CAT assessed South Africa in November 2006, no 
notable progress had been made towards tabling the draft legislation before Parliament. 
CAT requested detailed information within one year on progress made regarding the 
act,23 but this information was never submitted to CAT. 
 
In 2008, the Department of Justice circulated a third version of the proposed act for 
comment. Once again, there were notable shortcomings in the text, most importantly 
the fact that the definition of torture excluded the phrase “for such purposes as”, thus 
considerably narrowing the scope of the crime of torture. A number of civil society 
organizations made submissions on the act but, when the act was eventually tabled in 
May 2012, there was little evidence that these submissions, or the submissions on 
earlier versions of the act, had changed its substance. In September 2012 the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development held public hearings and nine 
civil society organizations made submissions.24 The submissions, in general, 
encouraged the legislature to seize the opportunity to provide for as comprehensive 
legislation as possible in order to promote compliance with UNCAT. However, for 
reasons that are not clear, but possibly for the sake of expediency, the committee adopted 
a narrow focus and, with the exception of a few minor amendments, adopted the version 
that had been tabled in Parliament. One notable exception is that the act now 
includes provisions for adherence to the principle of non-refoulement (which forbids 
rendering a true victim of persecution to his or her persecutor), which had not been 
                                                          
20 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Police of 3 August 2010, available at: <https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/11782/> (last accessed 13 August 2015)  
21 For example, in July 2012, two NGOs, the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative and the National Institute for Crime Prevention and 
the Reintegration of Offenders, made a joint submission. See, for example, Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative “Submissions on 
Combating of Torture of Persons Bill” [B 21 of 2012, 31 July 2012] at 1. 
22 L Muntingh and L Fernandez (2006) “Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative submission to the UN Committee against Torture, in 
response to ‘Republic of South Africa: First country report on the implementation of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment’”, available at <www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cat/docs/CSPRI.doc> (last accessed 
31 July 2015). 
23 CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1, para 28. 
24 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on 4 September 2012, available at: 




included in the tabled version. When the act was referred to the second house of 
Parliament, the National  Council  of  Provinces,  it  was  adopted  without  any  requests  
for amendment.25 On 25 July 2013, President Zuma assented to the act and four days 
later it was gazetted.26  
 
Regional developments in combating torture 
South Africa’s push to criminalize torture needs to be seen within the context of similar 
initiatives being undertaken in several other African countries. In 2008, also as a result 
of a UN Human Rights Committee review, Madagascar became the first country in the 
Southern African Development Community to criminalize torture in a law which also 
guarantees reparations to victims of torture.27 In 2009 Uganda criminalized torture in 
accordance with UNCAT, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment at the hands of a public official.28 In 2011 the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo recognized torture as a discrete crime in its Penal Code, with a definition in 
accordance with UNCAT;29 since the law was passed, several public officials have been 
sentenced to up to life imprisonment for acts of torture.30 Other African states that 
have passed anti-torture laws are Burundi (2009), Senegal (1996) and Cameroon 
(1997).31 In 2011 the Kenyan government drafted the Prevention of Torture Act in 
collaboration with civil society groups. However, at the time of writing this act had not 
yet been tabled before Parliament. 
 
The differences between torture as a crime under international human rights law 
and torture as a crime under international criminal law 
Although international human rights law, under which UNCAT resorts, and 
international criminal law, of which torture is a constituent international crime, are 
two distinct bodies of international law, they are intimately linked and reinforce each 
other as regards protection of the right to human dignity.32 Human rights law has 
imbued international criminal law with a greater sensitivity to the need to protect human 
dignity and to “safeguard life and limb as far as possible”.33 Given the fact that UNCAT is 
the only human rights treaty obliging states to criminalize torture as a discrete crime, it 
is instructive to discuss briefly how international criminal law and international human 
rights law deal with torture. 
                                                          
25 PMG report on the meeting of the National Council of Provinces Standing Committee on Security and Constitutional Development on 
20 May 2013, available at: <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15878/> (last accessed 8 August 2013). 
26 Act no 13 of 2013 Government Gazette no 36716 of 29 July 2013. 
27 See Act No 2008-008 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts 1, 2 and 4. 
28 See of the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act No 3 of 2012, arts 2, 3, 4 and 7. 
29 See Redress Trust Torture in Africa: The Law and Practice (2012, Redress Trust) at 14. 
30 See “The United Nations welcome that ‘Criminalization of torture in the DRC is moving forward’”, available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13517&LangID=E> (last accessed 13 August 2015). 
31 See Redress Trust Torture in Africa, above at note 29 at 12–14. At the regional level, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights commenced work in late 2014 on a general comment on art 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
with specific reference to torture and providing redress to victims of torture. See “Concept paper on the development of a general 
comment on article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” at 1–5, available at: 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/news/2015/05/d182/concept_paper.pdf> (last accessed 13 August 2015). 
32 See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2008, Oxford) at 6; F Jessberger “Bad torture: Good torture” (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1059 at 1068 and 1071; G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2009, Asser Press) at 
45–47.  





The definition of torture under UNCAT 
Article 1 of UNCAT defines torture as  
 
“Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
 
The  UNCAT  definition  of  torture  is  now  widely  accepted  as  reflecting customary  
international  law.34   It has been used as a  tool by national  courts,35 regional 
human rights courts36 and UN ad hoc criminal tribunals.37 The objective elements of the 
crime of torture under UNCAT are: the conduct must result in severe physical or mental 
suffering; the harm must be inflicted intentionally; the conduct must have a certain 
purpose; the perpetrator must be a public official or someone acting in an official 
capacity; and the torture excludes pain and suffering arising only from or inherent in 
acts which are lawfully sanctioned. The mens rea requirement is criminal intent. This 
means that negligent conduct can never be considered to be torture, although it can 




                                                          
34 See Prosecutor v Delalić and Others ICTY TC II, 16 November 1998 (IT-96-21-T), para 459; and Prosecutor v Furundžija judgment 
no IT-95-17/1-T, trial chamber, 10 December 1998, para 11. However, in Prosecutor v Kunarac and Others, IT-96-23/-23/1-T, trial 
chamber, 22 February 2001, para 482, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated 
that the definition of torture in UNCAT “cannot be regarded as the definition of torture under customary international law which is 
binding regardless of the context in which it is applied”. The Appeals Chamber confirmed this view, though in a differentiated way, 
stating that the UNCAT definition of torture “reflects customary international law as far as the obligation of states is concerned” and 
“must be distinguished from an assertion that this definition wholly reflects customary international law regarding the meaning of the 
crime of torture generally”: IT-96-23/-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 147. While this decision has been followed in 
subsequent decisions of the ad hoc tribunals (see, for example, Prosecutor v Semanza ICTR-97-20, Appeals Chamber, 20 May 2005, 
para 248 and Prosecutor v Limaj et al IT-03-66, trial chamber, 30 November 2005, para 240), the ad hoc tribunals have, in earlier 
decisions on the question of “pain and suffering” considered reports of the UN Human Rights Committee as well as the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. For a criticism of the Kunarac judgments, see P Gaeta “When is the involvement of state officials a 
requirement for the crime of torture” (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 183 at 188, note 10. See also, generally, on the 
ius cogens [peremptory norm] status of torture under international human rights law, Cassese, id at 151–52. 
35 See the South African Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Mthembu, above at note 11, paras 30–32, and the decision of the High 
Court of Kenya in Wakaba and Others v Attorney General (final judgment) Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts 
ILDC 1543 (KE 2010), paras 34–37. 
36 The first reference of the European Court of Human Rights to the definition of torture in UNCAT was in Selmouni v France (2000) 29 
EHRR 403, para 100. See also Ilhan v Turkey (2000) 7 EHRR 36; Turkey (2000) 34 EHRR 17. The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights adopted the UNCAT definition of torture in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, AfrCommmHPR, 
comm no 227/1999, 33rd session, 15–19 May 2003, para 70. 
37 See the early cases of Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR-96-4, trial chamber, 2 September 1998, para 681 and Delalić, above at note 34, 
para 459. However, since the judgments in Kunarac, above at note 34, UNCAT’s influence has diminished very significantly. For a full 
discussion, see C Burchard “Torture in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals” (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159 
at 162–63. 




Torture as a crime against humanity under the ICC Statute 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute defines the crime against humanity of 
torture as the “intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that 
torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions”.39  
 
The mens rea requirement is that the perpetrator knew that the conduct was or was 
intended to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population by a 
government or an organization.40 This definition draws on the element of “severe pain 
or suffering” contained in the UNCAT definition, except that the definition under the 
ICC Statute does not require that the conduct have a specific purpose. It is not clear why 
the purposive element is absent, although several speculations have been put forward, 
one of which is that the list of purposes would have to be an exclusive list of purposes. 
The former UN special rapporteur on torture, Sir Nigel Rodley, criticized this reasoning 
as “not wholly satisfying”, leaving us “with an outcome that remains unsatisfactory”.41 
Instead of the specific purpose requirement, article 7(2)(e) of the ICC Statute imposes a 
new requirement which is not contained in earlier instruments defining torture, namely 
that the victim of torture be “in the custody or under the control of the accused”. 
Compared to the UNCAT definition, this restriction does not seem to take account of 
the factual situation where the perpetrator does not have custody or control of the 
victims, but causes them severe mental pain by informing them of the severe pain 
being inflicted on their family members elsewhere. What is unclear is whether the 
perpetrator must control or have custody of the victim before inflicting the pain, or 
whether the pain and suffering must be inflicted beforehand in order to exercise 
custody and control. 
 
Torture as a war crime under the ICC Statute 
The ICC Statute regulates the war crime of torture for international armed conflicts42 
and for non-international armed conflicts.43 The statute includes torture or inhuman 
treatment as constituting a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, thus 
making each a war crime.44 The crime of torture as a crime against humanity and the 
war crime of torture do not, as UNCAT does, require the perpetrator to act in an official 
                                                          
39 ICC Statute, art 7(2)(e). 
40 Id, arts 7(1) and 7(2). Torture is listed in art 7(1)(f) as part of the definition of a “crime against humanity”. Art 30 stipulates generally 
that criminal responsibility is incurred only if the material elements of the crime “are committed with intent and knowledge”.  
41 NS Rodley “The definition(s) of torture in international law” (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 467 at 492. See also CK Hall in O 
Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd ed, 2008, CH Beck) at 254 (art 7, note 481) 
who wonders whether, given the anarchic, random and purposeless way in which crimes against humanity have been committed in the 
past few decades, often by neighbours and completely undisciplined forces, far removed from any conduct or acts aligned to carrying 
out a state’s or organization’s policy, conceptual consistency (ie by including the purposive element) might not be to the detriment of 
victims. K Ambos Internationales Strafrecht [International Criminal Law] (4th ed, 2014, CH Beck) at 300, marginal 208, rejects the 
need for a purposive element, arguing in support of a 2001 decision of the German Federal High Court (BGHSt 46,295) that torture 
consists of causing severe physical or mental pain and that this need not be in pursuit of a specific goal; all that is required is that the 
infliction of the pain is intentional. 
42 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(a)(ii). 
43 Id, art 8(2)(c)(i). 




capacity.  However, as under UNCAT, the war crime of torture requires that the pain or 
suffering inflicted must serve specific purposes. There is a dispute among the chambers 
of the international tribunals about whether the list of purposes is exhaustive. Whereas 
some trial chambers have preferred the open phrasing used in the UNCAT definition 
of torture,45  others have favoured an exhaustive list.46  
 
The elements of crime in the ICC Statute, which carry over the UNCAT list of purposes, 
introducing it with the words “such as” speak in favour of a non-exhaustive list.47  
 
The differences between the definition of torture under international human rights law 
and international criminal law are unavoidable, for the contexts within which the crime 
is perpetrated differ. The essential difference between UNCAT and torture under 
international criminal law is twofold. First, under UNCAT the discrete crime of torture 
is punishable as such, irrespective of whether it is committed in war or peacetime, or 
in the context of widespread  and systematic violence against civilians. Secondly, under 
UNCAT there must be direct or indirect involvement of a state official, an “implicit 
approval or condonation by the authorities”,48 to avoid a single act of torture 
committed by a private person against another private person being considered 
criminal under international law. Under UNCAT, criminal liability arises where state 
agents, who enjoy special coercive powers vested in them by the state, abuse such 
powers with impunity.49  
 
To sum up, UNCAT has been very useful in breathing meaning into the definition of 
torture in the fields of both international criminal law and international human rights 
law. The UNCAT definition of torture has guided both the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, which have no definition of torture in their enabling statutes. As one writer 
states, UNCAT “must be considered the standard, to the extent that its guiding 
considerations can be transferred to international criminal law”.50  
 
The state obligation to criminalize torture under UNCAT 
UNCAT distinguishes itself from other human rights treaties in that it compels states to 
criminalize torture, including attempts to commit it, as well as complicity or 
participation in torture.51 States parties are required to make these offences  punishable  
by  penalties  that  reflect  the  gravity  of  the  crime.52 While UNCAT does not prescribe 
a minimum penalty, one author considers a term of imprisonment of between six and 20 
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years appropriate, a conclusion reached on the basis of views expressed by individual 
members of CAT.53 Whereas in earlier years some commentators on UNCAT held the 
view that criminalizing torture at the domestic level did not necessarily mean that states 
parties enact a specific crime corresponding to UNCAT’s definition of torture, CAT has 
over the years shifted from urging states to enact a separate and distinct crime of 
torture to the point of requiring them to do so,54 even where national law criminalizes 
the physical abuse of a person by a public official.55 In its July 2012 decision in Belgium 
v Senegal, the International Court of Justice stated that that the obligation to criminalize 
torture has to be implemented as soon as the state is bound by UNCAT. In the words of 
the court: “[t]his obligation … has in particular a preventive and deterrent character, 
since by equipping themselves with the necessary legal tools to prosecute this type of 
offence, the States parties ensure that their legal systems will operate to that effect and 
commit themselves to co-ordinating their efforts to eliminate any risk of impunity”.56 
Had the present Sudanese president, Omar Al Bashir, for whom the ICC issued an 
arrest warrant in March 2009,57 attended the inauguration of President Zuma in May 
2009 or the football World Cup which South Africa hosted in 2010, South Africa would 
have been obliged to ensure that he was arrested and prosecuted for, amongst other 
international crimes, the crime of torture as a crime against humanity. Bashir chose to 
avoid such a situation by not attending these events. 
 
However, South Africa’s obligations under the ICC Statute did not absolve it from the 
duty to enact a separate crime of torture, in line with its obligations under UNCAT, 
which it had ratified. In 2013 South Africa enacted an anti-torture law which 
criminalizes torture as a discreet crime. The next section discusses this law. 
 
The South African prevention and combating of torture of persons act58 
The PCTPA defines torture as: 
 
“any act or omission, by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as to (i) obtain information or a 
confession from him or her or any other person; or (ii) punish him or her for an act 
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he or she or any other person has committed, is suspected of having committed or is 
planning to commit; or (iii) intimidate or coerce him or her or any other person to do, or 
to refrain from doing, anything; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity, but does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions”.59  
 
Critique of the key elements of the act 
The PCTPA gives effect to UNCAT by requiring that a public official or someone acting in an 
official capacity be involved in the torture. Rodley expressed the rationale for state 
involvement as follows: “[t]he fundamental idea is that, as is conceptually appropriate in 
the context of giving legal norms  to  human rights principles, the state violates the right 
through its agents, human rights being the normative articulation of the fundamental 
rules mediating the relationship of the organs of society -  typically the state - and the 
individual members  of  society”.60  
 
Accordingly, neither the worst form of abuse nor the most inhuman treatment of a 
person will be regarded as constituting torture under UNCAT unless the state participates 
in it.61 The drafters of UNCAT excluded private acts of torture from the definition on the 
assumption that these could be dealt with under ordinary, domestic criminal law.62   
This raises problems, discussed below, when private persons are contracted by public 
officials to carry out the torture. A private person can commit torture if the private 
person’s act is carried out with the acquiescence or consent of a public official.  As 
Rodley puts it: “[i]t may also be someone with no official status acting in collusion with, 
and to advance the purposes of officialdom, often to shroud the responsibility of 
members of that officialdom”.63  
 
Whereas UNCAT does not define a “public official”, PCTPA specifies that a public official 
“means any person holding public office and exercising or purporting to exercise a public 
power or a public function in terms of any legislation”.64 The phrase “to exercise a public 
power or a public function” could be interpreted to have a more expansive meaning, 
beyond the conventional understanding of “official capacity”. It suggests someone who 
is exposed to the public and who is regarded as an authoritative public figure, 
exercising authority publicly. This could, by implication, include persons who, by virtue 
of their authority, position and influence, do in fact or are likely to exercise power over 
people. For example, African traditional chiefs and headmen, who wield considerable 
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public authority, have no clearly defined legal status,65 although they are recognized by 
the constitution as “traditional authorities”.66 They, too, are bound by any international 
agreements which South Africa has ratified,67 including those relating to human rights. 
 
A loophole in UNCAT’s definition of the perpetrator is that it does not provide for torture 
by persons who are not acting in an official capacity but who, because of their public 
authority, are within the compass of those who are likely to commit torture. Examples 
include private security police who are contracted to the government, and off-duty 
policemen. A recent case is F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another68 which 
involved the use of brutal force by an off-duty policeman. The facts were as follows. An 
off-duty policeman on standby and clad in civilian clothes was driving an unmarked 
police vehicle in the early hours of the morning. He stopped to give a lift to a 13 year old 
girl, who accepted the lift, feeling that it would be safe to do so. Along the way, the 
policeman stopped the vehicle, assaulted the girl and then raped her. The girl laid 
criminal charges for assault and rape against the policeman, who was found guilty on 
both charges and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, five of which were suspended. 
Thereafter she brought a damages suit against the minister of police and the policeman 
in the Cape Town High Court, which found the minister vicariously liable for the 
damages suffered as a result of the policeman’s delictual conduct. The minister 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which overturned the High Court decision 
on the grounds that the police officer was off-duty at the time and that the minister was, 
therefore, not liable. The girl appealed to the Constitutional Court which, in a 
precedent-setting judgment, unanimously set aside the order of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal on the basis that the connection between the conduct of the policeman and his 
employment was sufficiently close to make the minister vicariously liable for the 
policeman’s unlawful acts.69 Amongst the factors that the court considered was that the 
girl looked to the policeman because of his employment as a policeman (a deduction 
she made from the visible dockets and police radio in the vehicle), “which placed him 
in a position of trust”,  a t r u s t  which he abused in view of her vulnerability and 
helplessness.70  
 
Other institutions contracted to the state or that are privately owned or run could 
include children’s homes, youth hostels and rehabilitation centres. Although they are 
private institutions, they still fulfil a state function, and their personnel are for all 
intents and purposes acting in an official capacity, carrying out a state-sanctioned 
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function, even though they are not paid by the state. The definition in the PCTPA of a 
public official, therefore, needs to include employees of such private institutions. 
 
Although the PCTPA does not specifically use the term “private person”, one may infer 
from a reading of section 3 that a private person may incur liability for torture where 
such a person acts “at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official”. This necessarily excludes private persons acting on their own. Several writers 
have criticized the failure of states to enact a separate crime of torture which covers acts 
of brutality that occur in the private sphere.71 At the public hearings preceding the 
passing of the PCTPA, several human rights groups submitted that torture be 
extended to cover sex workers, rape against women and other acts of violence against 
women and children.72 In its submission, Amnesty International argued that the bill (as 
it then was) should criminalize torture without the need to show a nexus to the 
involvement of public officials.73 What is often overlooked here is that article 1(2) of 
UNCAT leaves it open to states to enact separate legislation “which does or may 
contain provisions of wider application” than those contained in article 1 of UNCAT. 
 
The  purposive  element 
UNCAT’s definition of torture requires that the severe physical or mental pain inflicted 
on the person must be “for such purposes as”: to obtain information or a confession 
from the victim or another person; to punish, intimidate, intimidate or coerce the 
victim or another; or to discriminate against the victim or another person on any 
ground.74 All these purposes apply to situations where the victim is at least under the 
effective power or control of the person who administers the pain and suffering, using 
his advantageous situation to achieve a certain effect. The purpose requirement is the 
main distinguishing feature between torture and cruel or inhuman treatment.75 The 
purposes listed in the UNCAT definition are now recognized as having attained the status 
of customary international law,76 and most writers are of the view that they are merely 
illustrative and do not constitute an exhaustive list.77 This interpretation is inferred 
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from the phrase “such purposes as”, which precedes the purposes listed, connoting that 
other, similar purposes may be included as long they resemble the purposes listed 
expressly.78 It is not required that the conduct must be perpetrated solely for a 
prohibited purpose, as it suffices where the prohibited purpose is part of the 
motivation underlying the conduct and need not necessarily be the predominate or 
only purpose.79 For example, there is nothing illegitimate in obtaining information or 
a confession from someone, so long as this is within the law and not through torture. A 
common characteristic of these purposes is that they are all in some way connected 
“precisely to state purposes or, at any rate, the purposes of an organized political entity 
exercising effective power”.80  
 
The PCTPA replicates the purposes listed in the UNCAT definition and introduces them, 
like UNCAT, with the words “for such purposes as”. This is an improvement on the 
original wording of the PCTPA in which no such prefix was used, which meant that the 
enumerated list of purposes was exhaustive. The departure from the original wording is 
in part attributable to the strong criticism by human rights groups during the public 
hearings that were held before the law was enacted. Adherence to the UNCAT wording 
is important in two ways. First, it shows a preparedness to commit unvaryingly to the 
efforts to make the struggle against torture more uniform internationally. Secondly, 
the open list of purposes will enable the courts to expand the list of prohibited 
purposes. Indeed, the UN ad hoc tribunals, which have adopted a definition of torture 
similar to that of UNCAT, have expanded the list of prohibited purposes. In Prosecutor v 
Furundžija the court added the “humiliation” of the victim to the possible purposes of 
torture.81 In Kunarac and Others the ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed that, if one 
prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, “the fact that such conduct was also 
intended to achieve a non-listed purpose (even one of a sexual nature) is immaterial”.82  
 
Defences 
The aim of UNCAT is to prevent states from resorting to torture, no matter what the 
circumstances.83 In line with UNCAT,84 the PCTPA upholds the absolute, non-derogable 
character of the prohibition against torture. Section 4(3) of the PCTPA states that the 
fact that the person charged with the torture is a “head of State or government, a 
member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government 
official; or was under a legal obligation to obey a manifestly unlawful order of a 
government or superior” is neither a defence nor a ground for reducing the sentence once 
the person has been convicted. Section 4(4) reinforces the absoluteness and non-
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derogability of the prohibition by stating that even “a state of war, threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification 
for torture”. Furthermore, the act absolves from punishment anyone who disobeys an 
order to commit torture. 
 
The effect of this absolute prohibition is that no defence whatsoever can be invoked 
against a charge of torture.85 And no substantive ground for excluding criminal liability, 
such as self-defence or a state of necessity, is admissible as a defence. A more 
contentious issue is whether the crime of torture, as a crime under international 
human rights law, is subject to prescription. Article 6 of the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2005) provides that 
prescription “shall not apply for prosecuting violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law norms that constitute crimes under international law”, but 
makes this subject to the proviso “where so provided for in an applicable treaty or 
contained in other international obligations”. In the case of Barrios Altos 
(Chumbipuma and Others v Peru) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
asserted that “it is unacceptable to use … statutes of limitations … as a means of 
preventing the investigation and punishment of those responsible for gross human 
rights violations such as torture … which are prohibited as breaches of non-derogable 
rights recognized under international human rights law”.86 However, because there is 
scant evidence of state practice in this area, it cannot be conclusively established 
whether the inapplicability of prescription is now part of customary international law.87  
 
In recent times, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the 
categorical non-derogable ban of torture by international law has been put into 
question by many government officials, including those in democratic states. The use 
of torture is being justified on the grounds that it is a necessary tool to deal with “the 
global war on terror”, “exceptional circumstances”, “unique situations” or an “unrivalled 
and critical security challenge”.88 Such justifications conveniently brush aside the fact 
that the human right to dignity is not only the foundation for human rights law, but 
as also stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
foundation of “freedom justice and peace in the world”.  The need to protect the 
inviolability of human dignity is non-negotiable, and cannot be balanced against any 
opposing interests, including the right to life of a hostage. As Jessberger argues: “[a]ny 
exception to this position would implicate the risk of abuse and open the door to a 
dangerously slippery slope. Only a clear position that establishes criminal liability for 
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all acts of torture without exception can guarantee that torture is not routinely applied 
in difficult cases”.89  
 
The non-inclusion of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
What is regrettable is that the South African act does not criminalize cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment in accordance with article 16 of UNCAT. This 
shortcoming has been rightly criticized by NGOs.90 The omission reflects a narrow 
understanding of UNCAT, the drafters of which clearly intended liability for torture to 
attach not only to the torturer, but also to any other person whose conduct might well 
exclude the cumulative elements of the crime of torture, but whose acts or omissions 
still amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is precisely 
for this reason that UNCAT has been fortified with the Optional Protocol to the Torture 
Convention (OPCAT), which provides for a system of regular visits by independent 
bodies to places where people are involuntarily deprived of their liberty, to prevent 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,91 an 
instrument which South Africa has promised to ratify although it has not yet done so. 
Whether ratification will follow now that the law has been enacted remains to be seen. 
According to the Association for the Prevention of Torture, South Africa has stated that 
its ratification of OPCAT will be subject to a declaration that will delay the designation of 
a national independent visiting body for three years.92  
 
The PCTPA is also deliberately silent on what procedure an alleged victim of torture 
should follow to have the matter investigated. UNCAT explicitly spells out the procedure 
that should be adhered to once an allegation of torture is made. States parties must 
ensure that the complaint is investigated promptly and impartially;93 that the 
complainant has the right to have his complaint lodged with and examined promptly 
and impartially by competent authorities, and that both the complainant and 
witnesses be protected against ill-treatment or intimidation;94 and that the victim of 
torture obtains redress within the law and has an enforceable right to fair 
compensation, including the means for rehabilitation.95 The PCTPA provides none of 
these assurances; all it says is that the cabinet minister concerned must develop 
programmes to assist and advise “any person who wants to lodge a complaint of 
torture”.96  
 
At the public hearings on the bill, most of the human rights groups emphasized the need 
to provide victims of torture with effective remedies. The submissions highlighted how 
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state inaction against police abuse of power has come to shape perceptions of torture 
amongst victims. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
acknowledged that some people believe that torture is authorized by the state and is 
therefore acceptable. In a joint submission, the Trauma Centre for Survivors of 
Violence and the South African No Torture Consortium pointed to the fact that 
victims who had been tortured for political reasons under apartheid are usually still 
not ready to report past incidents of torture and receive counselling, because they 
rationalized torture as part of the struggle against oppression.97 These victims sought to 
address this trauma in a practical way, such as personal ideological preparation and as a 
promise of a better life. In its submission, the Centre for the Study of Violence 
elaborated on the need for the state to compensate survivors of torture without their 
having to go through the emotional and psychological strain that pursuing a civil claim 
entails.98 Several submissions underlined the need for the act to contain a definition 
of “victim” to include dependants or family of the actual victim, and others who may 
have been tortured for intervening on behalf of victims in distress. The act is 
unfortunately silent on all these matters. The fact that the act does not mention the word 
“victim” in its preamble or in its “objects” in section 2 is regrettable. 
 
Universal jurisdiction and immunities 
The act confers jurisdiction on South African courts to try a torture case if the suspect is 
a South African citizen, is ordinarily resident in South Africa, is “lawfully” in the country, 
or has allegedly committed the crime of torture against a South African citizen or 
against a person who is ordinarily resident in the country.99 It contains a general 
provision which grants universal jurisdiction to South African courts if the suspect has 
allegedly committed the crime of torture outside South Africa, but only if the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) consents to the prosecution in writing.100 
Article 6(2) of UNCAT would still require a preliminary inquiry, from the time the suspect 
arrives in the country, before the case is submitted to the NDPP.  If the NDPP finds that 
there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, but another state party to UNCAT requests 
that the suspect be extradited, South Africa could dispense with the need to prosecute 
by acceding to the request. On this point, the International Court of Justice held in  
Belgium v Senegal  that “the choice between extradition or submission for prosecution, 
pursuant to the Convention, does not mean that the alternatives are to be given the 
same weight. Extradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas 
prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which 
is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State”.101  
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The question is whether foreign heads of state and diplomats may be prosecuted for 
torture. Under international law, state officials enjoy functional immunity (ratione 
materiae or subject-matter immunity) from the jurisdiction of foreign courts for 
conduct carried out in their official capacity on behalf of their home state. This 
immunity does not lapse when the official no longer holds office, for their acts are 
ascribed to the state.102 A few classes of senior international officials, such as 
incumbent heads of state103 or government, diplomats, as well as ministers of foreign 
affairs, enjoy personal immunity (ratione personae or procedural immunity). The 
rationale for the immunity here is the “functional necessity”,104 meaning that, given 
the need for such officials to conduct state affairs internationally, it is important to the 
functioning of their home state that they should have freedom of action. However, this 
immunity is valid only for prosecution by states and does not survive when the official 
ceases to hold office.105 Furthermore, international tribunals may indict high 
officials, such as heads of state and senior foreign affairs officials, who are suspected of 
having committed international crimes, even if they are still in office.106  
 
By virtue of having domesticated the ICC Statute, South Africa, too, expressly excludes 
immunity for heads of state or government as well as government ministers and 
officials and members of Parliament.107 The contradiction here is that the Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges Act of 2001 exempts a head of state from the jurisdiction of 
South African civil and criminal courts.108 Dugard is of the view that this suggests 
that heads of state would not be entitled to plead immunity for crimes under the ICC 
Statute.109 This point of view was given currency in an historic decision of the North 
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria in May 2012 in the case of Southern African Litigation 
Centre and Another v The National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others.110 This 
case dealt with whether, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, criminal 
investigations relating to allegations of the commission of torture as a crime against 
humanity may be instituted at the domestic level against persons who acted outside 
South Africa. In a widely celebrated judgment, the court held that the decision of the 
National Prosecuting Authority and the Priority Crimes litigation Unit not to initiate 
an investigation into acts of torture as a crime against humanity under the national law 
implementing the ICC Statute was “unlawful, inconsistent with the Constitution and 
therefore invalid”.111 This decision was upheld by both the Supreme Court of Appeal 
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and Constitutional Court. The latter court highlighted that torture as a crime against 
humanity is proscribed under South Africa’s national law under section 238 of the 
constitution and section 4(1) of the ICC Statute, that the South African police have 
the authority and obligation under international law to investigate, “in particular, high 
priority crimes like torture as a crime against  humanity”,  and that “the customary  
international  law nature of the crime of torture underscores the duty to investigate 
this type of crime”.112 The Constitutional Court went on to add that the universal 
jurisdiction to investigate international crimes is not absolute, but is subject to the 
country with jurisdiction being unwilling or unable to prosecute, and to the 
investigation being confined to the territory of the investigating state.  
 
There remains the issue of immunity from prosecution regarding a crime committed  
in  violation  of  international  human  rights  law,  such  as  the crime of torture under 
UNCAT. This question arose in the Pinochet113 trial, in which a majority of the House 
of Lords held that personal immunity does not apply in the case of a criminal 
prosecution for torture, in view of the fact that torture is a violation of a peremptory norm 
of international law. Most of the Lords stated that allowing personal immunity would 
have been inconsistent with UNCAT’s provisions granting universal jurisdiction.114 
However, scholars differ on whether incumbent heads of state and senior state officials 
may assert personal immunity from prosecution before national courts of other 
jurisdictions.115 It is submitted that South African courts, when confronted with this 
question, would need to be guided by two crucial principles, namely that: “the 
prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a 
peremptory norm”;116 and UNCAT requires that the perpetrator be a public official or 
someone acting in an official capacity. In the authors’ view, if a critical element of the 
crime of torture is that it is associated with the conduct of the state, it would make no 
sense to allow immunity to prevail. Akande and Shah articulate this argument more 
forcefully in the following words: “[s]ince the Torture Convention limits the offence of 
torture to acts committed in an official capacity, extra-territorial prosecution can occur 
only in cases where immunity ratione materiae [because of the nature of the matter] 
would ordinarily be applicable. However, application of immunity ratione materiae 
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would deprive the jurisdiction provisions of the Convention of practically all meaning. 
Such a result would be contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty … ”117  
 
Lawful sanctions 
UNCAT’s definition of torture specifically excludes “pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”. This exception remains the most 
controversial and problematic element in the definition of torture.118  Miller describes 
it as “the exception that swallowed the rule - allowing a state to avoid the prohibition 
on torture simply by sanctioning methods of punishment that involve extremely harsh 
treatment”.119 The controversy centres on the fact that what may be regarded as a lawful 
sanction in one country could be unlawful in another. This results in an uneven and 
diverse implementation of UNCAT’s definition of torture internationally. 
 
One would think that the issue of lawful sanctions would not arise in South Africa, as 
penalties such as the death penalty, corporal punishment and forced hard labour are 
unlawful. However, practice shows that, despite the constitutional safeguards against the 
physical and psychological abuse of persons who are deprived of their liberty, conduct 
which would otherwise amount to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment continues to occur, especially in police stations and prisons.120 The 
prison authorities recently admitted that assaults by officials which cause “severe pain 
over a period of time, also mental pain and suffering” would qualify as torture.121 
However, prison authorities are at times lax in reporting such cases to the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (as it then was).122 The 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services is of the view that one of the 
consequences of torture only being prohibited by the Bill of Rights and not by any law 
governing correctional services is that “it is probable that torture loses its hierarchical 
importance in the genre of conduct of officials … ”123  
 
Returning to the PCTPA, in its definition of torture, the act replicates the “lawful 
sanctions” exception in UNCAT’s definition word for word, without any reference to an 
international benchmark, which would have been helpful. Here one may quote Sir Nigel 
Rodley, UN special rapporteur on torture in 1997, when he argued that: 
 
“The lawful exclusion must necessarily refer to those sanctions that constitute practices 
widely accepted as legitimate by the international community, such as deprivation of 
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liberty through imprisonment, which is common to all penal systems. Deprivation of 
liberty, however unpleasant, as long as it comports with basic internationally accepted 
standards, such as those set forth in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners, is no doubt a lawful sanction.”124  
 
A similar view to that of Rodley was taken by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights when it rejected Sudan’s defence of its criminal law under which five 
girls were sentenced to a public lashing with a wire and a plastic whip on their bare 
backs. It held that “[t]here is no right for individuals, and particularly the government of 
a country to apply physical violence to individuals for offences. Such a right would be 
tantamount to sanctioning state sponsored torture under the Charter and contrary to 
the very nature of this human rights treaty”.125  
 
While some countries have done away with the exception clause altogether in their 
implementing laws, thus tightening the definition of torture, others have either 
resisted such amendments126 or have clarified the meaning of “lawful sanctions” in 
their national laws. For example, Australia and New Zealand have qualified the 
“lawful sanctions” clause by adding after the word “sanctions” the words “that are not 
inconsistent with the Articles of the [ICCPR]”.127 It is submitted that South Africa, too, 
should add this wording to the qualifying clause. A reference to the ICCPR would 
constitute a more extensive range of international norms, covering a wider category of 
vulnerable persons than, say, a reference to the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners would. An even better solution would be to apply the test 
according to which the enquiry would be whether the “lawful sanctions” limit the 
rights of the arrested or detained person under section 35 of the South African 
Constitution. If yes, the next stage of the enquiry would be whether the “lawful 
sanctions” can be justified “in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom” as stipulated in the limitations clause in section 36(1) of 
the constitution. The Constitutional Court has held that “[a]t the very least a law or 
action limiting the right to freedom must have a reasonable goal and the means for 
achieving that goal must also be reasonable.”128  
 
Punishment 
Under the PCTPA, any public official who commits torture, attempts to commit torture, 
or “incites, instigates, commands or procures any person to commit torture is guilty of 
the offence of torture and is on conviction liable to imprisonment, including 
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imprisonment for life”.129 By prescribing a penalty of up to life imprisonment, the act 
reflects the gravity of the crime, thus giving effect to CAT’s recommendation to South 
Africa that the penalty for torture should aim “to prevent and eliminate torture and 
combat impunity”.130 The stiff tariff of punishment is aimed at ensuring that conduct 
which would otherwise be classed as a form of assault would attract a harsher 
punishment than has many times been the case until now.131  
 
Unfortunately, the PCTPA does not categorize torture as one of the serious crimes that 
attract a discretionary minimum  sentence,132 despite  the  fact that torture is regarded 
as an utterly abhorrent crime, “the most severe violation of human dignity”,133 “a crime 
of the highest order”,134 the prohibition of which is widely considered to be ius cogens [a 
peremptory norm]. The discretionary minimum provisions are meant to ensure that the 
courts impose a standardized, severe and consistent punishment for serious, listed 
crimes unless there are weighty grounds for imposing a lesser sentence.135 Subjecting 
someone found guilty of torture to a discretionary minimum sentence would show the 
universal condemnation of the torturer, the hostis humani generis136 [an enemy of all 
mankind], and would serve as a strong deterrent to any would-be torturer. By not 
stipulating a minimum sentence, the act creates the possibility that torturers are given a 
suspended sentence, which is clearly not in line with the spirit of UNCAT. 
 
The PCTPA lists a number of factors137 to be taken into account when imposing sentence, 
but is vague on how the courts should interpret them. It is submitted that these need to be 
substituted with concrete aggravating factors such as the duration of the torture, its 
frequency, the nature of the detention, the victim’s accessibility to medical and legal 
assistance, the severity of the mental and physical injuries suffered, and the number of 
persons who perpetrated the torture. 
 
Conclusion 
The PCTPA represents a significant and progressive development in the South African 
criminal justice system. It is the product of concerted efforts on the part of national 
and international human rights groups to bring the South African government to 
accept the need to prohibit torture and end the impunity with which it has been 
committed. More than this, it reinforces the only international human rights treaty 
that defines and criminalizes torture and which describes the manner in which its 
prohibition should be enforced at both the national and international level. The act 
represents a commitment to complying with the standards of UNCAT. However, in 
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order to give fuller effect to the range and reach of the prohibition set out in 
UNCAT, the act needs to be amended to provide for the criminalization of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As regards the perpetrator element, the 
PCTPA needs to include persons in the employ of private institutions or organizations 
that are contracted to carry out work on behalf of the state. A separate law would be 
necessary to provide for torture in the private sphere as provided by article 1(2) of 
UNCAT. In order to ensure that torture does not take place under the guise of lawful 
sanctions, “lawful sanctions” need either to be qualified by a concluding clause 
referring to the relevant provisions in the ICCPR, or be tested by using the limitations 
clause in the constitution as a yardstick. The penalties for torture need to be 
categorized as under the discretionary minimum sentencing provisions, with clear 
guidelines as to how the aggravating factors should be interpreted. 
 
Finally, the PCTPA has now prompted the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice 
and Correctional Services to propose changes in the current law that will limit the ability 
of someone charged with torture to obtain police bail and to be released with a warning 
in lieu of bail.138 Furthermore, it is expected that the Criminal Matters Amendment Bill 
[20 of 2015] will remove the current 20 year statute of limitation on the crime of torture. 
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